

No. 18-107

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED  
STATES

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R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,  
Petitioner,

v.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
and Aimee Stephens,

Respondents.

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On Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of  
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE LIBERTY  
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

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**INTEREST OF AMICUS<sup>1</sup>**

Liberty Counsel has been substantially involved in advocating for the right of individuals to receive, and licensed medical professionals to provide, counseling for individuals struggling with gender identity issues; for marriage as the union of one man and one woman; and for the religious liberty of Americans whose sincerely held religious beliefs compel adherence to Biblical positions on gender identity and marriage. Liberty Counsel has developed a substantial body of information regarding the issues presented by the ultimate question in this case. Amicus believes that the information provided in this Brief regarding “gender identity” as medically and legally distinct from the meaning of “sex” within Title VII and the threats to First Amendment rights posed by interpreting “sex” to include “gender identity” are critical to this Court’s consideration of the important questions at issue. This Brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, with the consent of all parties.

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<sup>1</sup> Counsel for a party did not author this Brief in whole or in part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or submission of this Brief. No person or entity, other than *Amicus Curiae* or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this Brief. Petitioners and Respondents have filed blanket consents to the filing of Amicus Briefs in favor of either party or no party.

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case presents the straight-forward question of whether discrimination on the basis of sex in Title VII includes “gender identity” discrimination. Although the common sense, medical, and legal meanings of “sex” are based on the biological distinctions between men and women, the lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions on whether Title VII’s prohibition against “sex” discrimination subsumes within it “gender identity” discrimination.

This Court’s precedent makes clear that Title VII’s prohibition against “sex” discrimination targets discrimination that is based on the “immutable” characteristics that divide men and women into one of two, separately-identifiable groups. Additionally, Title VII’s “sex” discrimination provision targets discrimination based on stereotypes about how men, *as a class*, and women, *as a class*, should look and act.

“Gender identity” discrimination, however, does not target men or women as a class but, rather, targets a subset of both men and women – those men and women who gender identify inconsistently with their biological sex. Thus, including “gender identity” within the meaning of “sex” discrimination does not protect men, as a class, or women, as a class, based on their status in one of the two unique and separately, identifiable classes. Rather, it would protect all individuals who gender identify inconsistently with their biological sex, which is not a characteristic unique to women, as a class, or men as a class.

Finally, interpreting “sex” according to its common sense, medical, and legal meanings leaves the question for Congress whether to add “gender identity” as a separate class. A significant policy question that Congress would need to address in making that determination is to properly weigh the First Amendment free speech and free exercise concerns implicated by adding sexual orientation to Title VII.

Liberty Counsel respectfully asks this Court to interpret “sex” within Title VII consistently with its common-sense understanding as identifying one of two, biologically distinct categories.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. A Common Sense Approach Dictates that Title VII’s Prohibition Against “Sex” Discrimination Does Not Include “Gender Identity.”**

#### **A. Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex.**

Title VII prohibits *specific* types of employment discrimination against an employee or prospective employee “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, *sex*, or national origin . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added). At the heart of this case is whether the word “sex” in Title VII includes “gender identity.” Although Harris asks this Court to interpret the word “sex” to broadly include “gender identity” because those categories are so closely connected to one’s sex, the reality is that “sex” and “gender identity” have medically and legally distinct meanings. As a result, this Court

should conclude that Title VII's prohibition of "sex" discrimination does not include a prohibition against discrimination based on "gender identity."

This Court has explained that "[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute." *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). Common sense dictates that the word "sex" is not synonymous with "gender identity." That understanding comports with dictionary definitions, medical professionals, and this Court's precedent. According to both the Oxford and Webster dictionaries, "sex" refers to the "[e]ither of two main categories (male and female) into which humans and most other living things are divided on the basis of their reproductive functions." Oxford Dictionary, available at <https://www.lexico.com/en/definitions/sex> (last visited Aug. 19, 2019); see also Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, available at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sex> (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) ("either of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species and that are distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis of their reproductive organs and structures"). The American Psychological Association similarly defines "sex" as the "biological status as male or female" with "attributes that characterize biological maleness and femaleness." Report of the APA Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 28 & Appendix C (2008), available at [www.apa.org/pi/lgbct/transgender/2008TaskForceReport.html](http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbct/transgender/2008TaskForceReport.html) (last visited August 19, 2019).

This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the biological reality that men and women fall into two distinct groups, most notably distinguishable by their reproductive capacities. “We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant . . . .” *Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty.*, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a law that prohibited statutory rape of a female under the age of 18, but not of men under the age of 18); *see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland*, 566 U.S. 30, 56 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that childbearing is a “biological function unique to women”); *General Electric Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male”).

The different reproductive capacities between men and women are, in part, what has led this Court to characterize “sex” as an *immutable* characteristic that falls into one of two, separately-identifiable groups. In *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), this Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute that prevented a female member of the uniformed services from claiming her husband as a dependent for the purpose of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical benefits without proving her husband was actually dependent on her income. The statute, however, permitted a male member of the uniformed services to claim his wife as a dependent without offering such proof of financial dependency. *Id.* at 679. This

Court discussed the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” in this Nation that “was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism,’” which led to “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes . . .” *Id.* at 684-85.

In striking down the federal statute, this Court recognized that “sex, like race and national origin, is an *immutable characteristic*” that “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.” *Id.* at 686 (emphasis added); *see also Kahn v. Shevin*, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (gender-based distinctions, “like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny, because it focuses upon generally immutable characteristics over which individuals have little or no control”). Thus, “statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the *entire class of females* to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.” *Id.* at 687 (emphasis added). Five years later, this Court explained that

Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could fashion his personnel policies on the basis of assumptions about the differences between men and women, whether or not the assumptions were valid. It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions about the characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual

assumptions about a woman's ability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less.

*City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart*, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).

The common-sense reality is that men and women are biologically distinct. That reality led to overt and pervasive discrimination against women as a class, which eventually resulted in legal protections for women in employment. After Title VII's implementation, to comply with equal protection guarantees, this Court held that Title VII protects both men and women from sex discrimination in the employment context, regardless of whether the employer is in the same class (male or female) as the employee. *Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.*, 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) ("it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group"). At its core, Title VII is designed to prevent discrimination against men, *as a class*, and women, *as a class*, based on notions of how men, *as a class*, or women, *as a class*, should look or act.

A few of this Court's sex discrimination cases from the 1970s highlight the pervasive discrimination women faced in the workplace that were premised on certain roles for men and women. In *Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld*, this Court confronted the question of whether a federal statute violated the equal protection secured by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it afforded

benefits to male wage earners that were not provided to female wage earners. 420 U.S. 636, 637 (1975). Specifically, death benefits of male wage earners were payable to the widow and the couple's minor children while death benefits of female wage earners were payable only to the minor children. *Id.* at 637-38. After his wife passed away, Mr. Wiesenfeld was denied social security survivors' benefits for himself because those benefits "were available only to women." *Id.* at 639-40.

After acknowledging the reality in the 1970s that it was more likely that men would be the primary supporters of their spouses, the Court explained that "such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' support." *Id.* at 645. Refusing to pay survivor benefits to the husband of a female wage earner fails to equally protect the efforts of female workers. "[S]he not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others." *Id.* at 645.

This Court concluded that the sex-based distinction was irrelevant to the statutory purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home to care for a child. *Id.* at 651. The rationale in *Weinberger* echoed this Court's rationale in *Frontiero*, decided two years earlier. "[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the *entire class of females* to

inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.” *Frontiero*, 411 U.S. at 686-87 (emphasis added).

In a strikingly similar case, this Court struck down a provision in the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program because survivors’ benefits were payable to the husband of a deceased wife only if he could prove he was receiving at least one-half of his support from his deceased wife, whereas a surviving wife did not have to satisfy the support requirement. *Califano v. Goldfard*, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977). Relying on *Frontiero*, this Court explained that the statutory support requirement “operates to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment . . . .” *Id.* at 207. The statute “disadvantages women contributors to the social security system as compared to similarly situated men.” *Id.* at 208. This Court characterized the presumption that wives are usually dependent on their husbands as based on “archaic and overbroad’ generalizations . . . .” *Id.* at 217.

Title VII’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination in the workplace equally protects against discrimination by men against women; women against men; men against men; and women against women. What the common-sense understanding, and historical purpose, of the statute does not do is protect against differential treatment based on one’s gender identity. The argument that “gender identity” discrimination is “sex” discrimination because “[o]ne cannot object to a perceived change of sex without basing the objection at least in part, on a person’s sex assigned at birth” is not a fair reading

of the text of the statute, and has nothing to do with the type of unfairness in employment that Congress legislated against in adding ‘sex’ to the list of prohibited categories of discrimination in Title VII.”

**B. A Person’s Mental Perception About Whether His or Her Biological Sex is Correct Does Not Fall Under “Sex” Discrimination.**

While a person’s “sex” falls into one of two identifiable groups and is based on biology, “gender identity” is fluid and based on a person’s “internal sense of being male, female, some combination of male or female, or neither male nor female.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The American Psychological Association expressly states that “sex” and “gender” are not the same. American Psychological Association, *Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression*, available at <https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender>. “Sex is assigned at birth, refers to one’s biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes such as chromosomes, hormone prevalence, and external and internal anatomy.” *Id.* “Gender,” on the other hand, “refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for boys and men or girls and women.” *Id.* Although “sex” and “gender” are not synonymous, courts often interchange them when referring to sex or gender discrimination. However, they are not the same and the informal use of gender

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender identity](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender%20identity); *see also* American Psychological Association, *Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression*, available at <https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender> (“[g]ender identity refers to a person’s internal sense of being male, female, or something else”); American Psychological Association, *Report of the Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance* 28 (2009), available at <https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf> (last visited August 19, 2019) (“person’s basic sense of being male, female, or of indeterminate sex”). In fact, the Lexico Dictionary, powered by Oxford, expressly states that “gender identity” is “[a] person’s perception of having a particular gender, *which may or may not correspond with their birth sex.*” Lexico Dictionaries by Oxford, available at [https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/gender\\_identity](https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/gender_identity) (emphasis added).

Not only is gender identity based on the person’s *sense* of being male, female, or other, but it can change. Unlike “sex,” which is binary, “gender

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to refer to sex should not be used as a means to now protect gender identity. Taken together, sex and gender are the biological and societal realities faced by women as generally distinct from men, which differences resulted in Title VII protections against sex discrimination.

identity” is fluid and encompasses a virtually unlimited number of identities. These identities include “agender” (“a person who does not identify with any gender identity”); “androgynous” (“a person who does not identify with or present as either a male or female”); “cis” (“meaning a person who identifies with the sex they were born with”); “gender fluid” (“a person whose gender identity and presentation are not limited to one gender identity”); “genderqueer” (“a person who identifies as something other than as part of the traditional two-gender system”); “pangender” (an identity label “that challenges binary gender and is inclusive of gender-diverse people”); “transgender” (“a person of a gender not traditionally associated with their sex at birth”); and “two-spirit” (“a person who has both masculine and feminine characteristics and presentations”). Ronald S. Katz & Robert W. Luckinbill, *Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport*, 28 *Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.* 215, 216-220 (2017).

Because “gender identity” is fluid and based a person’s mental sense of self (regardless of whether that perception matches biological sex), it would frustrate the purpose of Title VII’s prohibition against “sex” discrimination if it were subsumed into “sex” discrimination. First, Title VII protects against discrimination in the workplace based on sex – that men, as a class, and women, as a class, should be afforded the same opportunities. Title VII was designed to provide a remedy when one of two, identifiable groups was discriminated against because he or she is a member of that identifiable group. See *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677, 687-87 (1973). Because a person’s “gender identity”

does not necessarily correspond with biological sex, any discrimination that occurs because of “gender identity” is not “because of” sex – in other words, it is not discrimination against that person because he or she is a member of the biologically male or biologically female class.

To broadly interpret “sex” discrimination to include someone with the mental sense of being male, but who is in fact a biological female, does not advance the purposes of ensuring that women, *as a class*, and men, *as a class*, are afforded the same workplace opportunities. In effect, to state that “sex” discrimination includes “gender identity” is to say that a person can be a member of *both* of the two, identifiable groups and still assert a discrimination claim against *one* of the two, other identifiable groups.

For example, a man who is a biological member of one group (males) but who thinks he is a member of the other identifiable group (females) can assert a discrimination claim either as a man or as a woman. This Court’s jurisprudence has made clear that Title VII ensures that a person is not discriminated in the workplace based on the fact that he or she is a member of *one* of two identifiable groups who is subject to discrimination because he or she is a member of *that* group.

Second, Title VII seeks to protect against discrimination based on being a part of an easily identifiable group with immutable characteristics. *See Frontiero*, 411 U.S. at 686 (“sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic”). Given its fluid nature and multitude of identities, “gender identity” is neither immutable nor easily

identifiable. As a result of the fluidity, an employee could identify and present as male at the outset of employment and then later present and/or identify as female. That would undermine Title VII's purpose because the employee would be asking for protection *not* because he or she is a member of one of the two, identifiable groups but because he or she desires *to switch from one group to another*. Yet, Title VII protects men, as a class, and women, as a class, when they are discriminated against based on immutable, biological characteristics that cannot be changed.

The fluidity of gender also means it is not easily identifiable. *See* Ronald S. Katz & Robert W. Luckinbill, *Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport*, 28 *Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev.* 215, 216-220 (2017) (identifying more than fifty gender identities). In fact, including "gender identity" within "sex" discrimination would permit an individual whose gender identity is consistent with his biological sex to still argue that he was subject to "gender identity" discrimination if he *believes* his employer perceived him to be a different gender identity. Because of gender identity's fluidity, there is, in essence, no objective standard by which to determine whether something constitutes "sex" discrimination.

Two decisions arising out of the District Courts in Connecticut and the District of Columbia highlight the direct assault on the binary nature of sex. In concluding that a prospective employee stated a prima facie case of "sex" discrimination based on "gender identity," the court referred to prior decisions adopting the biologically-based, binary nature of sex as an erroneous "narrow view"

of the “word ‘sex’ . . . .” *Fabian v. Hospital of Cent. Connecticut*, 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 526 (D. Conn. 2016). It expressly rejected what it characterized as the “traditional binary conception’ of sex” and adopted a so-called “layman’s reaction” to include “discrimination on the basis of factors that are sufficiently ‘related to sex or that have something to do with sex.’” *Id.* at 525. The court then went on to explain that “sex” simply referred to the “property by which individuals are so classified.” *Id.* at 526. The court concluded that the properties by which people are classified male or female “would surely” include gender identity because the “layman’s reaction” would understand it to have “something to do with sex . . . .” *Id.* at 527.

Several years earlier, another court explained that “gender identity” necessarily constitutes “sex” discrimination when it is against a man who “intended to become legally, culturally, and physically, a woman . . . .” *Schroer v. Billington*, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008). That court reached its legal conclusion after stating that it did *not* need to resolve the competing medical views on whether gender identity is a component of one’s sex or one’s sexuality. One of those views was based on the notion that sex is not binary in nature but based on one of nine factors – one of which was biological sex. What’s interesting about those factors is that all but one (sex or rearing) are all biologically or genetically based: chromosomal sex; hypothalamic (hormonal) sex; fetal hormonal sex; pubertal hormonal sex; sex of assignment of rearing; internal morphological sex (internal accessory organs for reproduction); external morphological sex

(differentiation of the external genitalia); and gonads. *Id.* at 306 n.7. Despite the lack of evidence that sex is based on anything other than biology, the court concluded that “gender identity” was subsumed under “sex” discrimination.

In contrast with these two cases are earlier cases concluding that sex is biologically determined. In one case, the Texas Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature should determine whether someone who undergoes a sex change surgery should be legally treated as having changed his sex. In refusing to permit the man to change his sex designation on his birth certificate, the court explained that because “male chromosomes do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery . . . . [A] post-operative female transsexual is still a male.” *Littleton v. Prange*, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999). Other courts have similarly relied solely on biological sex to determine a person’s sex. *See Kantaras v. Kantaras*, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that sex is determined at birth); *In re Ladrach*, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio. Prob. Ct. 1987) (“A person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination.”).

The later cases that treated “gender identity” as falling under “sex discrimination” refused to treat sex as binary and biologically based. Applying the rationale of those cases, in order to protect against possible discrimination claims, an employer would need to be entirely blind to an employee’s biological sex. Stephens’ arguments highlight this point.

Stephens, who is a biological male, argues that Harris Funeral Homes engaged in

discrimination because Harris Homes considered Stephens a male in order to conclude that Stephens should not be able to identify and present as a woman at work. *See* Br. for Stephens at 25 (“because he viewed her as ‘a man’ makes explicit that he fired her ‘because of her sex’”). In other words, Stephens desires to penalize Harris Homes because it expected its employees to gender identify consistent with their biological sex. If Stephens’ claims are considered sex discrimination, then employers will be required to view their employees as asexual – thus giving employees the freedom to identify and present as either sex, based on their *mental* sense of self. However, this Court has consistently held that people fall into one of two, separately identifiable categories – male and female – and stated that Title VII’s prohibition against “sex” discrimination does *not* require androgyny or asexuality. *Oncale v. Sundowner*, 523 U.S.75, 81 (1998) (discrimination “on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace”).

If “gender identity” were protected as sex discrimination, it would transform legal protections afforded to men or women based on stereotypical notions of what role men or women, *as a class*, should have in the workplace into protections based on a person’s sense of gender. As a result, an employee could assert a Title VII claim based on the argument that he is biologically a member of one class and desires to switch to another. Nothing in this Court’s prior Title VII jurisprudence suggests that one’s “gender identity” was what Congress intended to protect when it originally enacted Title VII or in any subsequent amendments to the Act. If

Congress desires to protect “gender identity,” then it would need to amend Title VII to add another category. Absent Congressional amendment, there is nothing preventing “Title VII from expanding into a general civility code.” *Id.* Which this Court has long refused to do.

**C. Congress Did Not Intend Discrimination on the Basis of Sex to Include Gender Identity.**

Recognizing the limitations on devising Congressional intent, there are nevertheless several reasons to conclude that Congress did not intend for “sex” to include gender identity. First, the fact that Congress has added “gender identity” as an additional protected category in other statutes is evidence that Congress understands that the words have different meanings.<sup>3</sup> “[O]ne of the most basic

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<sup>3</sup> Gender identity is protected as a separate category under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13701, *et seq.*, as well as federal statutes providing funding to state and local authorities for investigation and prosecution of certain crimes motivated by prejudice based on the specified categories. A federal statute also requires colleges and universities to report information about crimes on campus including crimes involving bodily injury to any person in which the victim is targeted because of his or her protected status, which includes sexual orientation and gender identity. 20 U.S.C. §1092, *et seq.* The *Hively* dissent identifies other federal and state statutes that specifically prohibit

interpretive canons” is that “a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” *Corley v. U.S.*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting *Hibbs v. Winn*, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see also *Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport*, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (expressing “deep reluctance” to interpret statutory provisions “so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment”). If “gender identity” discrimination is itself “sex” discrimination, as is argued in this case, then it would render “gender identity” superfluous in those statutes.

Another relevant canon of construction is *noscitur a sociis*, which instructs courts that “a word is known by the company it keeps . . . .” *S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. Of Environmental Protection*, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006). That canon is “invoked when a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the ‘words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.’” *Id.* (quoting *Dole v. Steelworkers*, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)).

The fact that Congress has chosen in other statutes to include “gender identity” alongside “sex” reflects its understanding that the terms are distinct, even if related in some way.<sup>4</sup> One’s sex

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discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity as classes distinct from sex. *Hively*, 853 F.3d at 363-64.

<sup>4</sup> The gradual changes to President Nixon’s original executive order concerning equal employment in the federal government shows that the Executive

refers to the biological fact of being male or female. A person's mental sense of gender constitutes his or her gender identity. To conclude that "gender identity" is subsumed within the prohibition against discrimination "because of sex" would violate the canon of construction against construing words in a statute so as to render any of them "superfluous, void, or insignificant." If Congress understands them to be distinct concepts in other statutes, this Court should not read sex in Title VII to also include sexual orientation.

Using those same canons of construction, but turning to the specific language of Title VII, "sex" should be interpreted as one word in a group of words with some related meaning. Except for

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Branch understands the terms are distinct. In 1969, the Executive Order discussed the language in Title VII, explaining that employment discrimination in the federal government would prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Executive Order 11478, 34 FR 12985 (Aug. 8, 1969). In 1978, President Carter amended the executive order to include "handicap." 44 FR 1053 (Dec. 28, 1978). In 1998, President Clinton again amended the executive order to include "sexual orientation." 63 FR 30097 (May 28, 1998). He amended it in 2000 to add "or status as a parent." 65 FR 26115 (May 2, 2000). Then, in 2014, President Obama amended it to add "gender identity," such that the original Executive Order's prohibition against "sex, or national origin" was revised by substituting it with "sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin." 79 FR 42971.

religion, all of the categories listed in section 2000e-2 are based on immutable characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). *See also Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”). Gender identity, however, is not an immutable characteristic like race, national origin, or sex. Gender identity is fluid and encompasses a virtually unlimited number of identities. *See* Ronald S. Katz & Robert W. Luckinbill, *Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport*, 28 *Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.* 215, 216-220 (2017). As discussed below, the fact that seventy-seven to ninety-four percent of transgendered youth eventually identity consistent with their biological sense is further evidence that gender identity is not immutable.

Thus, except for religion, which has its own historical basis for inclusion in Title VII, the categories presently listed include immutable characteristics over which individuals have no choice and cannot change. To interpret “sex” to include “gender identity” would ignore the cannon giving items grouped in a list as related in some way.

Second, the ordinary meaning of “sex” does not subsume within it “gender identity.” When interpreting a statute, the Court looks “first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” *Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 93, 100 (2012); *see also Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk*, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning” (quoting *Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer*, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995))). Here, “sex”

is not defined in Title VII. However, as discussed above, the common sense, ordinary meaning of “sex” refers to the immutable, biological characteristics of a man or woman, frequently tied to their distinct reproductive capabilities. “Gender identity,” however, refers to one’s sense of gender, regardless of whether it is consistent with the biological reality of the person’s actual sex. Gender identity and sex are not the same and do not serve Congress’ intent in prohibiting sex discrimination.

Third, Congress can be presumed to have expected “sex” to be interpreted consistently with the understanding then, and now, that it refers to the biological classification of people into one of two classes based primarily on their reproductive capacities. Stated more directly, given the pervasive discrimination against women that led to the addition of “sex” in Title VII, Congress did not intend to protect within “sex” discrimination a biological male who identified as a female or the biological female who identified as a male.

## **II. Gender Identity Discrimination is Not *Per Se* Sex Stereotyping.**

In *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, this Court concluded that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination. Specifically, sex stereotyping is sex discrimination because “an employer acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be . . . .” 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989). Sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination because Congress intended to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” *Id.* at

251 (quoting *City of Los Angeles, L.A. Dep't of Water and Water v. Powers*, 435 U.S. 702 707 n.13 (1978)). This Court explained that “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” *Id.* at 251. “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming that they matched the stereotype associated with *their group* . . . .” *Id.* (emphasis added).

When an employer refuses to hire someone based on a stereotype of what men, as a class, or women, as a class, should look or act like, the employer “treats applicants or employees not as individuals but as members of a class that is disfavored for purposes of the employment decision by reason of a trait stereotypically assigned to members of that group as a whole.” *Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 100, 157 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting). “Gender identity” discrimination, however, is not an example of sex stereotyping prohibited by Title VII. An employer who disfavors a biologically male applicant who identifies as a female is not discriminating against the prospective employee because he is male, but because he refuses to identify consistent with his biological sex.

Admittedly, the employer is acting on the assumption that a biological male will identify as a male, but the employer is not deploying a stereotype about men or women to the disadvantage of either sex. Such disparate treatment of women, as a class,

or men, as a class, is the focus of Title VII. To conclude that discrimination based on “gender identity” is subsumed within “sex” discrimination is to penalize an employer for expecting biological males to identify as males and biological females to identify as females.

It bears emphasis that for this Court to conclude that sex stereotyping, as a form of sex discrimination does not include stereotyping based on one’s sense of gender is not a conclusion that such discrimination is appropriate. Rather, it means that in order for “gender identity” to be a protected class, Congress will need to amend Title VII to add “gender identity” as a separately-identified category.

### **III. Interpreting “Sex” to Include “Sexual Orientation” or “Gender Identity” Would Threaten First Amendment Rights.<sup>5</sup>**

When discussions take place on how to accommodate a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, they often ignore the impact those decisions will have on those who must conform their actions to avoid violating nondiscrimination

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<sup>5</sup> This brief addresses both gender identity and sexual orientation in the discussion of threats posted to First Amendment rights because (1) the questions of whether gender identity and sexual orientation are included in Title VII are both before the Court in related cases; (2) the two categories are often added together when nondiscrimination provisions are amended; and (3) the threats to First Amendment rights are similar in nature under both circumstances.

provisions. The plaintiffs' asserted interests in those cases generally rest on the idea that failure to accommodate his or her sexual orientation or gender identity causes harm, isolation, discrimination, or stigmatization. Those interests, however, should be weighed against the significant interests of those who might be forced to change their policies or actions. All too often, those interests are ignored or trivialized. Whether it is a school forced to grant boys access to the girls' locker room, a physician who is forced to perform a double mastectomy on a woman who wants to be a man, prisons required to house men in women's facilities, or businesses forced to compromise their sincerely held religious beliefs or other business standards, courts often overlook the religious, scientific, medical beliefs, or other significant interests of those required to accommodate a person's sexual orientation or gender identity.

Controversies surrounding accommodations or nondiscrimination codes in schools based on sexual orientation or gender identity arise in the context of curriculum decisions, anti-bullying policies, access to restrooms and locker rooms, and counseling services. The three significant interests implicated in these situations are parental rights, the health and safety of children, and privacy interests. Although some courts have refused to acknowledge parents have rights concerning the curriculum once the parents make the choice to place their children in the public school,<sup>6</sup> the fact is

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<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., *Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist.*, 427 F3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005), *amended by* 447 F.3d

that the goal of curriculum and anti-bullying policies is to change the way students perceive and understand sexuality and gender.

As a promotional video for a public school in California demonstrates, the curriculum goes beyond trying to dispel certain stereotypes about what toys girls and boys should play with or what jobs they should pursue. *Creating Gender Inclusive Schools Trailer*, NEW DAY FILMS, <https://www.newday.com/film/creating-gender-inclusive-schools> (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). The schools encourage students to perceive sex and gender as fluid and, therefore, perhaps that they should identify as a gender inconsistent with their biological sex. In the video, the teachers explain the success they have had in getting children to reconsider their views on gender identity. The video shows each young child in the classroom going up to the white board and placing an “x” on a line representing where on the spectrum they would place themselves in terms of identifying as a boy or a girl. *Id.*

These curriculum decisions implicate the rights of parents to direct the education and upbringing of their children on issues where many people have legitimate, conflicting opinions. In addition, when schools are introducing young, elementary-aged, students to these materials,

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1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (student survey); *Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc.*, 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995) (school assembly involving sexually explicit content).

parents might not be prepared to have their child exposed to some of these issues at such an early age.

The curriculum decisions also implicate the health of children. There is a medical consensus that seventy-seven to ninety-four percent of all children with gender dysphoria reconcile their gender identity to their biological sex as they progress through puberty into young adulthood. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care at 11, available at [https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/Standards%20of%20Care\\_V7%20Full%20Book\\_English.pdf](https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/Standards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf) (last visited August 19, 2019). When schools use curriculum emphasizing to children that gender confusion might mean they have a gender identity that does not match biological sex, they ignore the realities that such confusion is a natural part of becoming comfortable with being a male or female. As a result, there is concern that more children are opting to label themselves with a gender that is inconsistent with their biological sex, which can cause them to become entrenched in that belief. One expert explained the impact this way:

It appears likely that being conditioned to believe you are the opposite sex creates ever-greater pressure to continue to present in this way, especially in young children. Once one has made the investment of coming out to friends and family, having teachers refer to you by a new name and pronoun, will it really be so easy to change back? Pediatric transition doctors in the Netherlands who first

pioneered the use of puberty blockers in dysphoric children caution against social transition before puberty precisely because of the high desistance rates and the likelihood that social transition will encourage persistence.

Lisa Marchiano, *Outbreak: On Transgender Teens and Psychic Epidemics* 60 Psychol. Persp. 345, 351 (2017).

Steering children toward adopting a gender identity different than their biological sex is, at best, a risky course to pursue. Not only are there are many known medical and psychological health risks as they pursue a path that seeks to alter their sexual characteristics to align with their gender identity, but the dearth of research on the long-term consequences of puberty-suppressing and cross-gender hormones should caution against so quickly encouraging children to explore a gender identity different than their biological sex. *Id.* at 351.

The anti-bullying or anti-discrimination policies similarly seek to change how people perceive sexual orientation or gender identity by penalizing noncompliance. One situation arising with some frequency is how people must address someone who identifies as a gender different than his or her biological sex. In an Oregon case, a transgender schoolteacher won a \$60,000 settlement after co-workers allegedly failed to address a biological male teacher as “they.” Bradford Richardson, *Transgender teacher wins \$60k settlement for co-workers’ improper gender pronouns*, WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/>

25/transgender-teacher-awarded-60k-improper-pronouns/. In the settlement, the school also agreed to build gender-neutral restrooms at all district schools. *Id.* An Indiana school teacher was forced to resign because he refused to refer to students by their chosen gender identity rather than their biological sex. Brianna Heldt, *Indiana Teacher Forced to Resign Over Refusal to Use Transgender Pronouns*, TOWNHALL (June 6, 2018), <https://townhall.com/tipsheet/briannaheldt/2018/06/06/indiana-teacher-forced-to-resign-over-refusal-to-use-transgender-pronouns-n2487919>. Initially, he reached an agreement with the school where he would refer to all students by their last name rather than a pronoun. He was then told that he would have to use the student's preferred pronoun. *Id.*

In a Wisconsin case, a high school girl who identified as a boy sued the school district after the school she attended refused to permit her to use the boys' restroom. Jacey Fortin, *Transgender Students Discrimination Suit is Settled for \$800,000* NYT, *available at* <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/transgender-wisconsin-school-lawsuit.html>. The student alleged in her complaint that she would be humiliated if required to use the girls' restroom. The school district reached an \$800,000 settlement for its "discrimination." *Id.* In a Florida case, a school disciplined a teacher for refusing to monitor the boys' locker room as the middle school students undressed, because a girl, who identified as a boy, was using the boys' locker room. *See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John's County*, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296-97 (M.D. Fla. 2018).

The anti-bullying and anti-discrimination policies, even outside the school context, leave no room for disagreement. For example, New York City recently passed an ordinance that requires employers, landlords, and other businesses to use the preferred name and pronoun of the employee, tenant, or client regardless of an individual's biological sex. Eugene Volokh, *You Can Be Fined for Not Calling People 'Ze' or 'Hir,' If That's the Pronoun That They Demand You Use*, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY OPINION: WASH. POST (May 17, 2016), [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/17/you-can-be-fined-for-not-calling-people-ze-or-hir-if-thats-the-pronoun-they-demand-that-you-use/?utm\\_term=.6e876b84a4da](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/17/you-can-be-fined-for-not-calling-people-ze-or-hir-if-thats-the-pronoun-they-demand-that-you-use/?utm_term=.6e876b84a4da). Noncompliance can be met with fines up to \$250,000. *Id.*

A recent Canadian case arose when a man identifying as a female filed a human rights complaint against a local waxing spa that turned him away when he requested a bikini wax. Mary Caton, *Transgender Woman Files Human Rights Complaint Against Windsor Spa*, WINDSOR STAR (May 13, 2018), <https://windsorstar.com/news/local-news/transgender-woman-files-human-rights-complaint-against-windsor-spa>. The spa explained to the man that it could not perform the service because the spa's only employee who performed the services was a Muslim who held religious beliefs that precluded her from physical contact with males outside her family. Although the spa did have one employee who performed waxing services on men, that employee was on sick leave. *Id.* In late 2018, a nonprofit, evangelical organization in Austin, Texas

filed suit seeking an injunction against a local Austin, Texas ordinance that would require it to hire or retain homosexuals or transgendered individuals. Alexia Fernandez Campbell, *Texas Evangelical Groups Are Suing for the Right to Discriminate Against LGBTQ Workers*, VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), <https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17961620/texas-evangelical-lgbtq-discrimination-lawsuit>. The organization explained that those “lifestyles are contrary to the biblical, Judeo-Christian understandings of sexuality and gender.” *Id.*

Controversies surrounding medical professionals involve two sides of the same coin: (1) prohibiting medical professionals from taking non-hormonal or surgical steps they believe would help a person struggling with gender identity issues, or (2) requiring medical professionals to perform medical procedures they believe violate their duty to “do no harm.” The claims concerning denial of care have included a hospital’s refusal to perform a double mastectomy on the healthy breasts of a female college student, a physician’s refusal to provide female hormones to a male, a hospital’s refusal to perform a hysterectomy on a healthy uterus, and a hospital’s refusal to perform chest reconstruction surgery on a female who had her healthy breasts removed as part of her transition to adopting a male identity. Amy Littlefield, *Meet the Trans Law Student Suing His Doctor for Canceling His Gender Affirming Surgery*, REWIRE (Jan. 3, 2018), <https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/03/meet-trans-law-student-suing-doctor-canceling-gender-affirmation-surgery/> (refusal to provide male hormones to female); Claudi Buck & Sammy Caiola,

*Transgender Patient Sues Dignity Health for Discrimination over Hysterectomy Denial*, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 20, 2017), <https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and-medicine/article145477264.html> (refusal to perform hysterectomy); *States Largest Healthcare Network Sued for Refusing to Provide Care to Transgender Man*, ACLU WASH. (Dec. 20, 2017), <https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/states-largest-healthcare-network-sued-refusing-provide-care-transgender-man> (refusal to perform chest reconstruction).

Forcing medical professionals to perform these procedures violates the rights of conscience medical professionals hold to help heal their patients. In some situations, the policies also violate the free speech and free exercise rights of medical professionals. Not only are doctors being sued for their refusal to surgically alter or remove healthy body parts, but licensed mental health professionals are increasingly being prohibited from counseling minors who are struggling with *unwanted* gender confusion or same-sex attractions. See Rena M. Lindevaldsen, *An Ethically Appropriate Response to Individuals with Gender Dysphoria*, 13 Liberty U. L. Rev. 295, 296, 318 (2019) (identifying the state statutes and discussing the litigation). Eleven states prohibit mental health providers from counseling patients to help them align their gender identity with their biological sex. *Id.* at 296. Eighteen states and a host of municipalities similarly prohibit licensed mental health providers from counseling patients who are struggling with unwanted same-sex attractions. See Movement Advancement

Project, *Conversion Therapy Laws*, available at [https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion\\_therapy](https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy) (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). Instead, the counselors can only affirm existing gender identity or sexual orientation, *even if the patient does not desire that gender identity or sexual attraction*. Thus, youth who need help working through natural feelings during their formative years are denied that help. *See* Lindevaldsen, *supra* at 318-319 (discussing the legislative efforts to ban such counseling and the court decisions involving challenging to those bans); *cf. Pickup v. Brown*, 740 F.3d 1208, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (after concluding that speech by medical professionals is exempt from First Amendment protection, upholding a ban prohibiting counseling to individuals who would like to align their gender identity with their biological sex), *abrogated by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); *King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey*, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming a ban on counseling to help minors deal with unwanted same-sex attractions), *abrogated by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

The controversies surrounding business owners forced to accommodate a person's perceived gender identity mirror the legal issues that have arisen in the context of businesses forced to comply with sexual orientation nondiscrimination policies. When faced with public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, flower-shop owners, bakers, photographers, and wedding-venue providers, asserting that their

sincerely-held religious beliefs prevent them from providing the service, have received court decisions, often involving sizeable monetary penalties, holding that they engaged in unlawful discrimination. *See State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc.*, 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) (flower shop); *Gifford v. McCarthy*, 137 A.D.3d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2016) (wedding venue); *Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Indus.*, 289 Or. App. 507 (2017) (refused to bake a wedding cake); *Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey*, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017) (wedding videographers); *Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock*, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (photographer).

At least one business owner has been subjected to litigation involving claims that he engaged in discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. On the same day that Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop obtained a favorable ruling from this Court for refusing to bake a custom cake for a same-sex wedding ceremony, he had a complaint filed against him at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for refusing to bake a cake celebrating a person's gender transition. *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n*, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723, 1732 (2018); Scott Shackford, *Can a Baker Be Forced to Make a Transgender Celebration Cake?*, REASON.COM (Aug. 15, 2018), <https://reason.com/blog/2018/08/15/can-a-baker-be-forced-to-make-a-transgen>.

In *Masterpiece*, this Court reversed the decisions below, which held that Phillips engaged in sexual orientation discrimination when he refused to bake a custom cake for a same-sex wedding reception. 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1732. During the entire

litigation, which worked its way to the United States Supreme Court, Phillips asserted that his strong, religious beliefs prevented him from baking a custom cake celebrating a marriage contrary to the Bible. *Id.* at 1723-24. Thus, when he was asked to bake the gender transition cake, he again refused based on his religious beliefs. In June 2018, the attorney who requested the custom cake filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission against Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop. Scott Shackford, *Can a Baker Be Forced to Make a Transgender Celebration Cake?*, REASON.COM (Aug. 15, 2018), <https://reason.com/blog/2018/08/15/can-a-baker-be-forced-to-make-a-transgen>.

These business situations implicate First Amendment free speech and free exercise of religion issues. When businesses are compelled to refer to a person by his or her gender identity rather than biological sex, or based on choices concerning sexuality, it infringes the free speech rights of the business. Similarly, forcing business owners to make business decisions that conflict with the sincerely-held religious beliefs of the owners of the entity raises free exercise of religion issues. *See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767, 2785 (2014) (United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate required closely held corporations to provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception contrary to the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies' owners is unconstitutional under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).

## CONCLUSION

This case presents an opportunity for this Court to clarify for lower courts that “gender identity” is not subsumed within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. That conclusion would leave Congress to decide whether to add “gender identity” as a separate category and, in the process, weigh the significant First Amendment concerns raised by adding that new category.

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